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UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Ian Pomplin*

The Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat.
862 (2017) was enacted into law on June 23, 2017, in an effort to
reform a troubled government agency that has had the media shine
a spotlight on its abuses and waste. This new law significantly
lowers the standard of evidence to take adverse actions against
federal employees at the Department of Veterans Affairs, overrides
collective bargaining agreements, and greatly shortens notice and
response time periods that are constitutionally guaranteed. This
comment will discuss the history of due process in federal
employment, assess the constitutionality of the new law through
the Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test, and determine if its
requirements violate the Due Process Clause. This comment
suggests that the law is counterproductive, leading to a further
deterioration of the Department of Veterans A ffairs. Lastly, this
comment will investigate the challenges involved in working to
overturn or repeal this law. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
is ill equipped lo handle federal employee due process claims. The
law and others like it have been passed with broad bipartisan
support, which will make it hard for the legislature to change
course.

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Marquette University Law School, May 2019. The author
would like Lo thank his family for their support during the writing and ewting prncess
for this comment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On J une 23, 2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 1
(Accountability Act) was enacted into law in an effort to reform
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The Department had
been rocked by recent scandals in 2014 involving government
employees that had falsified documents, outbreaks of disease,
long waitlists, and retaliation against whistleblowers.2 An
accountability bill was soon passed by the House of
Representatives to combat this scandal, and was targeted at
senior executives at the VA.3 That law did not end the issues
plaguing the Agency, and Congress decided that the increased
accountability needed to be applied to workers that were not
working in executive positions.1 The 2017 Accountability Act,
enacted as a remedy, viola tes federal public sector employees'
constitutionally granted rights.

II. THE HJ STORY OF FEDERAL PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
The hist ory of just cause and due'process in the federal civil
service stems from two places; 1) a series of congressional acts and
executive orders modifying the acts, and 2) a line of judicial
precedent in regards to the Fifth Amendment due process clause,
which states, "No person shall [...} be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law''.s The Supreme Court has
since incorporated the Fifth Amendment due process clause to the
states; in addition to stating that a public employee has a property
right in his job,6 so all levels of government need to provide due

1. Dep't. of Veterans J\IT. Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-41, Stat. 862 (2017).
2. Katiti Zezima, Everything you need to kMw about the VA and the scandals engulfing
it, '!'HE W ASHING'l'ON PO!."'I' (May 30, 2014),
https://www.was hingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/201~/05/21/a-guide-to-the-va-andth e-scandals-cnguJ fing •iU.
3. Ed O'l<cefc, What is the VA Accountability Act?, T HE WASHING'rON l'OS'r (May 21,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post- politics/wp/2014/05/21/what-isthc-va-accoun tability-act/
4. Sen. Marco Rubio et al., Commentary: VA bureaucracy continues to protect bad
employees, hu rt U.S. troops, AIR FORCE 'l'I.MP.S: Vls:'l'EIIANS (May J I, 2017),
https://www.airfo1·cetimes.com/veLcl'ans/2017/05/ l I /com monlna·y-va-bureaucracy•
conLi nues-Lo-proLect-bod-cmployees-hurt-11-s-LrOOps/.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
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process before taking significant adverse actions against
employees. The Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability
and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 7 violates the Fifth
Amendment right to due process.
A. Due Process in Public Employment

The Civil Service was created in 1883 by the Pendleton Act8,
which was a replacement to the previous spoils system.9 The
spoils system was plagued by incompetence and corruption,
because individuals were selected for govcmmental positions
based upon political loyalty and not talent. 10 The Pendleton Act
was passed into law on January 16, 1883, in an attempt to reform
federal employment by instituting a competitive exam-based
hiring process. 11 This was to "[test] the fitness of applicants for
the public service" and required the exams be "pl'actical in their
character" and "fafr[ly] test the relative capacity and fitness" of
the applicant. 12 The act also created Lhe Civil Service Commission
(CSC), a precw'sor to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 13 The
CSC was charged with evaluating and hiring employees tlu·ough
the competitive exams. 14 However, due process was not included
in the Civil Service until an Executive Order by William McKinley
in 1897, mandating that no removals may be made from the Civil
Service without just cause, a notice period, and an opportunity for
the employee to respond. Lo
However, no legislation was passed into law to ensure that
the McKinley Executive Order was followed until 1912, when the
Lloyd-LaFollete Act16 was passed, codifying the just cause
7. See Department of Veterans Affai1·s Accountabi lity and Whistleblower Protection
i\ct of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-4], 131 Stat. 862 (2017).
8. Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, ch. 27, § 1, 22 Stat. 403.

9.

U.S. MERJT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, WHAT IS DUE PROCESS IN FEDERAL CIVIL

3-5 (2015) [hereinafter What is Due Process?] (the "spoils
system" stems from the phrase "Lho spoils of wnr", the "wai:" being federal elections,
and the "spoils" being the federal government posilions tha~ were awarded Lo political
part,r supporters as a reward for political contributions).
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. Id.
12. Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, ch. 27 § 2, 22 Stat. 403.
13. Id. at§ l.
14. id. at §2.
15. Exec. Order No. 101 (Ju ly 27, L897), https://0-heinonlineorg.libus.csd.mu.eclu/JIOUPage?collection=presidents&handle=hein.presidents/prsex
cuo000 1&id=284&men_tab:srchresu\Ls.
16. Lloy<l-LaFollette Act. of 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 555.

SERVJCi,; EMPLOYMENT?
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standard and the required notice and opportunity to respond. 17
Congress passed this act in an attempt to curtail adverse actions
taken in reprisal for whistleblowing, and the statute granted the
Civil Service Commission a right to review records pertaining to
the adverse action. 18 However, no right to a hearing or
examination of witnesses was required under the Lloyd-LaFollete
Act unless the official performing the removal provided them. 19
Due to the limited scope, the focus at this time was on the
procedure of the removal, not the cause of the removal. 20
In 1944, the Veterans' Preference Act 21 arrived, granting
returning World War Two veterans a preference in being hired
into the Civil Service, and also giving those veterans a right to file
an appeal with the Civil Service Commission for any major
adverse actions. 22 However, the Veterans' Preference Act did not
require any federal agencies to follow the Civil Service
Commissions' decisions, so the Veterans' Preference Act was
amended in 1948 to require agencies to follow the CSC
recornmendations. 23 While the Veterans' Preference Act covered
veterans, it was up to the individual agencies to decide what
protections to grant non-veterans, if any.24 However, agencies
that had greater national security duties, like the Department of
the Army, Mutual Security Agency, and the Veterans'
Administration did extend the hearing and appeal rights to nonveterans for adverse actions rising from misconduct, poor
performance, and malfeasance. 25
The watershed moment in federal civil service was in 1978,
when Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). 26
This disposed of the patchwork protections given to civil service
employees from the previous legislation and executive orders
mentioned, and transitioned all federal civil service employees to
a consistent standard across all executive agencies. 27 This
legislation also split the Civil Service Commission into the Merit
17. Id. at §6.
18. What is Due Process?, supra note 9, at 6.
19. Id.
20. Jd. at 7.
21. Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387.
22. What is Due Process?, supra note 9 , at 7.
23. Id. at 7-8.
24. /d. at 8.
25. SENATE COMMI'r'l'EE: ON POS1' OFFlCE AND CML SERVl CE, APPEALS AND GRIEVANCE:
PROCEDURES IN 'l'HE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 8 (J 953).

26. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
27. What is Due Proces.~?. supra note 9, at 9-10.
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Systems P rotection Board (MSPB), the Office of P ersonnel
Management (OPM), and the F eder al Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA) .28 The CSRA gave the MSPB reviewing power over all
adverse action s taken under the CSRA. 29 This legislation also
enumerated the right for all civil service employees to have notice
of the charges in an adverse action, a reasonable opportunity to
respond, and the abflity to appeal decisions in front of a neutral
body.30 This was the last major civil service law applicable to
general service employees government wide; there have been
subsequent laws pertaining to different types of employees and
department specific changes, but many have been short lived. 3t

B. The History of the Vet erans Administration and the
History of the Department of Veteran s Affa irs
The Veterans Administration, the direct predecessor to the
Department of Veterans Affairs, was created in 1930 by President
Herbert Hoover, through Executive Order 5398.32 This order
combined various World Wa1· I-era veterans programs, like the
United States Veterans Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions, and the
National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers into one
independent government agency. 33 The Veterans Administration
would exist as an independent government agency until 1988,
when the agency was renamed the "Department of Veterans
Affairs" and elevated to a cabinet level position.34
Recently, a few agency specific laws have been introduced
that would have changed the Department of Veterans Affairs
procedures on employee removals and adverse actions, 35 and one
agency specific law that passed changed the VA handling of the
Senior Executive Service, stripping many of the employee
protections that Senior Executives were entitled to receive. 36 The
2014 Accountability Act, which was passed quickly with little
28. See generally Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
29. Id. (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §1205 (1982)).
30. Id. (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §7503 (1982)).
31. What is Due Process?, supra note 9, at 33, 36.
32. Exec. Order No. 5398, 38 C.F.R. §1.1 (1938).
33. Id.
34. Department of Veterans Affairs Act of 1988, Pub. IJ. No. 100-627 §2.
35. E.g. H.R. 2189, 113th Cong. (2013); Demanding Accountability for Veterans Act of
2013, H.R. 2072, 113th Cong. (2013); Dep't. of Veterans Aff. Mgmt. Accountability Act
of 2014, H.R. 4031, 113th Cong. (2014).
36. Veterans' Access to Care through Choice, Accountability, and Transparency Act of
2014, P.L. 113-146, 128 Stat. 1798 (codi• ecl at 38 U.S.C. §713 (2014)).
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debate, significantly shortened the notice and response period
mandated by the Fifth Amendment, and 1·emoves the opportunity
for Senior Executives to appeal the Agency decision to the MSPB37

C. Judicial Interpretation and Incorporation of Due
Process
The judicial history of due process in public employment
starts at the state level, with Cleveland Board of Education u.
Loudermill. 38 The Court held that public sector employees, if a
statute is in place that grants them just cause protection, have a
property intei-est in their jobs, and due process is required under
the Fifth Amendment to take away that property interest.39
James Loudermill was an employee of the Cleveland Board
of Education, and a civil servant.40 Prior to his hiring, Loudermill
claimed that he had never had been convicted of a felony, which
was untrue. 41 Upon the Board of Education discovering this
dishonesty, he was removed from his job without an opportunity
to respond to the charge or to challenge the decision. 42 Ohio had
a statute at the time that civil service employees were covered
under just cause protection. 43 The Supreme Court held that the
state could give the property right, in this case a job, but cannot

freely take the property away or limit due process procedures that
concern taken property.44 The Court also held that if due process
applies, the question becomes what process is due, and clarified
that even if the facts of the adverse action were clear, due process
was still required. 45 Removal without due process prior to
termination is unconstitutional, and an employee must be given
notice and opportunity to respond. 46 However, pre-termination
procedures, while still required, can be abridged if a sufficient

37. See Ashton HubighusL. B11/rancillg Accow1tability at the Department of Vctcratts
Affairs: The Legality of //111 Veterans Access, Choice, cmcl Acco11ntability Act of 201'1
Under the Due Process Clause, 64 CATH. U. L. Rr-:v. 10115, 105'1-55 (2015} (dii;cussinc
t.hc unco nstiLuLionaliLy of lhe 2014 staL\1lc).
38. See generally Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
39. ld. at 538-39.
40. ld. at 535.
41. ld.
42. Id.
'13. Id.
44. Id. at 541.
45. ld. at 538, 541.
46. Id. at 546.
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post-termination procedure exists.47
The Loudermill doctrine regarding an employee's property
rights and the due process required to take that property has
since been recognized by the Supreme Court as applicable to the
federal civil service. ~s In Lachance v. Erickson49 six federal civil
service employees were removed after making false statements
during investigations into misconduct that were independent
grounds for an adverse action.Go In the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist explicitly includes the Loudermill doctrine into
the evaluation of whether these employees received adequate due
process.61 The Federal Circuit has since stated that the federal
statutory employment scheme creates a property interest i11
continued employment because it is specified that civil service
employees may only be dismissed fol' cause or unacceptable
performance.02 It does not matter that the Civil Service Reform
Act does not explicitly state the need for due process,;;3 the
implication of the assurances for continued employment extend
the Fifth Amendment to public sector employees.
Judicial doctrine, along with legislative history in the area of
due prncess and property rights pertaining to civil service jobs,
shows a clear indication of when due process applies. If the
government has designated a job as having a just cause
p1·otection, Lhis makes the job a property right. 54 Once the job is
a property right, the government then has to provide procedures
fo1· adverse actions, including a notice procedure and an
opportunity to respond.55 In addition, the government can strike
a balance between governmental needs and the rjsk of an
erroneous property deprival to determine how much process is
due, but they cannot wholly deprive an individual of a1l due
process. 56
The history of federal employees receiving due process
pl'Otections for their job is long, and short of repealing the Civil
Service Reform Act and the language that states a federal job

47. ld. at 5117-48.
48. What is Due Process?, supra not.e 9, al 18
49. Lachance v. Erickson, 522 US 262 (1998).
50. Id. at 264.
51. Id. at 266.
52. Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1374-1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
53. See generally Civil Service Reform Act of l 978, supra not,e 26.
54. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997).
55. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 5'16 (1985).
56. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), discussed infra.
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shall have just cause protection, subsequent legislation must
provide due process before adverse actions are taken. The
Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (Accountability Act)57
unconstitutionally curtails employee due process rights. To show
this, the Accountability Act will be compared to the Civil Service
Reform Act to determine what procedures have changed, and then
the Accountability Act will be evaluated using the Matthews u.
Eldridge balancing test58 to determine if the due process provided
by the Accountability Act is sufficient. If the Accountability Act
fails this balancing test, repeal seems to be th e only way to remove
the act, since the Federal Circuit Court overwhelmingly upholds
the MSPB decision in federal employment cases and the MSPB
decision is hamstrung by the Accountability Act requiring a low
standard of proof in MSPB proceedings. Finally, this
Accountability Act may in fact do nothing to improve the
Department of Veterans Affairs and instead acts as a symbolic
piece of legislation for anti-organized labor politicians, and an
effort to privatize government services further.

Ill. C CVIl, SERVICE REFORM ACT VS. THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY
ACT

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 forms the basis of most
civil service jobs across the executive branch, and formed the basis
of Title 5 of the U.S. Code.69 Title 5 has two chapters that deal
with adverse actions for all federal employees in the executive
branch, Chapter 43 Performance Appraisal and Chapter 75
Adverse Actions.60 The Accountability Act provides an alternative
to be used solely by VA. 61 There are significant differences
between the Title 5 adverse action procedures and the adverse
action procedures from the Accountability Act.

57. Department of Veteran s Affairs Accountability an d Whistleblower Protection Act
of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862.
58. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
59. See generally Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, P .L. 95-454, 92 Stat . 1111.
60. 5 U.S.C. §7503 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (2017) (as amended
by P.L. 115-41).
61. Department of Ve Le rans Affairs Accountability and Wbfatleblower Protection Act
of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §714).
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A. Title 5, Chapter 75: Adverse Actions

Chapter 75 Adverse Actions are split into two different levels
of severity, with different procedures for each level. The first
applies solely to suspensions of 14 days or less.62 This type of
adverse action requires advanced written notice, a "reasonable
time to answer" orally and in writing, the right be represented by
an attorney or another representative, and a written decision with
the specific reasons for suspension, provided at the "earliest
practicable date". 63 'L'his minor reprimand is not appealab1e to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) unless another statute
applies as well, such as in cases of whistleblowing or
discri.mj nabon.64
More serious adverse actions, such as removals, suspensions
of more than 14 days, demotions in pay or gi-ade, or furloughs for
more than 30 days, receive more extensive procedure and
protections under Chapter 75.ll5 When taking adverse action
against employees, the vast majority of federal executive branches
prefet· taking action under t his section of the US Code.66 A
Chapter 75 adverse action is determined by managerial
disc1·etion, and can be taken for both conduct issues and
performance issues.G7 The decision must be reasouable and for
"such cause as wil l promote the efficiency of the service," and the
punishment must not be excessive to the charged behavior.GS This
test includes twelve " DoLLglas factors" to assess the
reasonableness of the agency's decision, but none of these twelve
factors are controlling, and they require the agency to perform a
balancing test to dete1·mine the proper discipline. 69 Even if the
62. 5 u.s.c. §7503 (2012).
63. What is Due Process?, supra note 9, at 27.
64. ld.
65. 5 u.s.c. § 7513 (2012).
66. U .S. MERIT SYSTEM PROTEC'f1ON BOARD, AODRESSlNG POOR PERFORMBRS AND THE
l.AW (ScpL. 2009),
htlps://www.msph.gov/mspbsearch/viewdocs.nspx?tlocnum ber=44584 l &version=4469
88&upJ)licaLion=J\CROBJ\'l'. [l1ercinafLer Poor Porformon•J.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Douglas v. Veterans Ad min., 5 M.S.P,B. 313, 337 (1981).
69. Id. at 332. 1'he f,welvo fact.ors for evaluation are:
(1) The nature nnd seriousness or the oITcnsl!, nnd its relation to the employee's duties,
11osition. ond respon$ibiliLies. including whelhcl" the offense was intonLional or
tcchnicnl 01· inadvert.enL, 01· was committed molicio11sly or for gain, or wns frequently
repeat.eel:
(2) The employee's job level and typu of employment, inclnding supervisory or fiduciary
role, conLacts with the public, and promjnenco of the position;
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Agency properly applies the Douglas factors, if (1) there was a
harmful error in the application of the procedures, (2) the adverse
action is discriminatory or in retaliation to whistleblowing, or (3)
the decision was against the law in any other way, t he decision
shall not be uphcld.70
Along with the reasonableness evaluation, Chapter 75
removals have statutorily defined due process procedures. 71 As
stated in Loudermill, procedural due process fox government
employees with just cause protections include notice and an
opportunity to respond.Tl Chapter 75 has statutorily defined
entitlements for employees who have an adverse action taken
against them. When an agency proposes a n adver se action, an
employee is entitled to thirty days advanced written notice stating
the reason for action, unless there is cause to believe the employee
has committed a crime.73 The employee is then allowed to answer
the notice in a reasonable amount of time, with a minimum of
seven days response ti me, and may be represented by an attorney
or another representative.74
Finally, the employee will receive a written decision at the
"earliest practicable date", and may appeal this decision to the
MSPB. 75 Once appealed to the MSPB, the agency's decision must

(3) The employee's past disciplinary record;
(4) Tho employee's past work l"ecord, including length of service, performance on the
job, ability to get along with fellow workers, and dependability;
{5) 11he oITecL of the offense upon the employee's ability Lo perform at a satisfactory
level nnd its effect upon supervisors' confidence in Lhe employee's ability to perfo1·m
assigned duLies;
(6) Consistency of the penally with those imposed upon other employees for the same
or similor oITcnses;
(7) Consistency of the penalty with any applicable agency table of penalties;
(8) The notoriety of the offense or its irnpnct. upon the reputation of the agency:
(9) 'rho clarity wit.h which lhe employee wn:1 on not.ice of any rules thal where violated
in commiLLing the offense. 01· had been warned about the conclucl in quest.ion;
(10) Potential for the employee's rehabilitation;
(11) Mitigating circumstances surrounding tho offense such as unusual job tensions,
personality problems. mental impairmenL, harassment, or bad foith, mulice or
p1·ovocation on Lho part of others involved in the matLc1·; and
(12) The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter such conduct in
the future by the employee or others.
70. 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (c)(2) (2012).
71. 5 u.s.c. § 7513(b) (2012).
72. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 642.
73. 5 u.s.c. § 7513(b)(1) (2012).
74. 5 u.s.c. §§ 7513(b)(2)-(3) (2012).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b),(d) (2012).
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be supported by a preponderance of the evidence76, or in other
words, "the agency has the bu1·den to prove it is more likely than
not that the conclusion reached was correct."77 If the action taken
by the agency does not meet the Douglas factors, the MSPB can
mitigate and modify the agency's penalty.78 'fhis system was
carefully crafted to fit closely with the Constitution and to make
smc that adve1·se actions "stick" while preserving employee's
Constitutional rights. 79
B . Title 5, Chapter 43: Performance Appraisal
Adverse actions taken under Title 5, Chapter 43 are
exclusively actions taken due to poor performance of an e mployee
in a critical element of the job. The procedures under Chapter 43
are similar, but have two notable differences. First, Chapter 43
actions have a lower standard of proof, only requiring substantial
evidence upon appeal, and second, a performance improvement
plan (PIP) must be proposed and implemented prior lo the
adverse action.so As the Merit Systems Protection Board reports,
"[t]he use of a PIP is the primary trade-off supervisors must
accept if they want to use the lowe1· buxden of proof that Chapter
43 offers."81
A performance improvement plan typically includes clea1·
performance standards, how those standards will be measured,
any assistance the agency will offer the employee to improve, and
specifies bow long the PIP wi.11 rem.ain in place.82 PIPs are
supposed to be flexible based upon job description and agency
need, so there isn't a strict list of things that a PIP must include,
just a recommended list from which the agency can pick and
choose.83
The Douglas factors are not requi red for a Chapter 43 action,
and the MSPB cannot mitigate the penalty the agency chooses to
use in the adverse action.84 The key appellate proof in Chapter
43 actions, which is not required in Chapter 75 actions, is the
76. 5 U.S.C. § 770l(c)(l)(B) (2012).
77. Poor P erformers, suprn note 66, aL 7.
78. Id. at 10.
79. What is Du,e Process?, supra noLe 9, at 30.
80. Poor Performers, supra note 66, aL 7.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 9-10.
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"critical element." A critical element "means a work assignment
or responsibility of such importance that unacceptable
performance on the element would result in a determination that
an employee's overall performance is unacceptable."85 The critical
element must be specified in the PIP, and must inform the
employee of the expected acceptable performance. 86 If the critical
element is not clear, it can only be clarified, and not rewritten. 87
Critical elements that are beyond salvage, to the point the
element needs to be rewritten, cannot be used for a Chapter 43
action. 88
Chapter 75 can be used for performance-based adverse
actions as well, but all Chapter 75 procedures must be followed. 89
Due to the higher initial burden on management to be proactive
in Chapter 43 actions, and the pressure for the PIP to be written
correctly, Chapter 43 was used approximately 42% of the time in
FY 2007, while Chapter 75 was used in approximately 58% of
adverse actions taken in that same year.90 The Department of
Veterans Affairs between FY 1998 and FY 2007 resembles a
similar split, with the VA preferring Chapter 75 actions 62% of
the time, and only using Chapter 43 actions 38% of the time. 91
C. Title 38, Chapter 7: Veterans Affairs Employees

On June 23 rd , 2017, the Accountability Act was passed into
law, a nd created a thfrd way to take adverse act ions against
employees working for the Department of Veterans Affairs. The
Accountability Act includes all employees who work for the
Department, except for senior executives92, political appointees93,
p1·obationary employees94 , a nd sp eciaJized employees s uch as
physicians, medical center directors, and others.95 The employees
85. 5 C. F'.R. §430.203 (2018).
86. Poor Performers, supra note 66, at 10.
87. Id.
88. ld.
89. Id. at iii.
90. Id. at 13-14.
91. i d. at 15.
92. 38 U.S.C. § 714(h)(l)(A) (2012).
93. 38 U.S.C. § 714(h)(l)(D) (2012).
94 . 38 U.S.C § 714(h)(l )(C) (2012).
95. 38 U.S.C. § 714(h)(l)(O) (2012) (l'cfcrring to 38 U.S.C. §§7306, 1,101(1), 7401(4),
7406 ("an individual appointed pursuanL to sections 7306, 7401(1), 7'10 1(4), or 7405 of
I.h is Litle"
Section 7306 is the controlling section for the OCfice of the Under Secretary of Health
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not excluded have received a sharp decrease in due process from
this Accountability Act, in direct contrast to the carefully
constructed process from the CSRA.
Adverse actions taken under the Accountability Act are
taken at the Secretary of Veterans Affair's discretion, and can be
taken for either misconduct or poor performance.96 The Secretary
can remove, suspend, or demote any individual covered by the act
with little due process.97 After the Secretary makes this decision,
the aggregate time for notice, response, and final decision is set at
a maximum of 15 business days.98 During those 15 days, a seven
day block of time is allotted to the individual for a response. 99
After 15 business days have passed, it is statutorily required for
the Secretary to issue a final decision in writing. 100
'l'he law provides for a modified and expedited appellate
review of the decision at the MSPB by an administrabve judgeJOL
T he appeal must be ulcd within 10 business days a~er the final
decision has been made.102 After receiving the appeal, the
administrative judge has 180 days to complete the case and issue
a final decision. 10:i The standard of review is notably lower for
these §714 removals than for removals taken under the CSRA.
For these §714 removals, the stan dard of evidence used is
"substantial evidence", and agency decisions that are supported
by substantial evidence must be deferred to by the administrative
judge, and cannot be nutigated. 10 4 Substantial evidence is defined

Section 7401(1) applies to "Physicians, denlisLs, podinb·ists, chi1'0lll'llct.ors,
optometrists, registered nurses, physiciun assistants, and expanded-function dentnl
auxiliaries."
Sec Lion 7401 ('1) applies to "Dil'ectors or medical centers and directors of Veterans
lnteg,·oted Service Net.works wiLh demonstl'n.Lcd ability in tho medical profession, in
health cnro administration, or in health Clll'0 fiscal management.''
Section 7'105 RJ>plios Lcmpo1·ary full-time nppointments, pol't-time appoi11t.mcnt!;I, and
withouL-compcnsaLion appointmcntS in posiLions listed under 7401(1), 7'101(3)
(vnrious healthcare pl'Ofessionnls not specified under 7'101 (I) who provide direct health
care to vctcra11s), lihrnrians, ond "Other professional, clc1·icnl, Lcchnical, and unskilled
personnel (including intol'ns. resid<mt.<;, trainees, uncl students in medical supporL
programs).'')
96. 38 U.S.C. § 714(a)(l) (2012).
97. 38 U .S.C. § 714(a)(2)(A)-(C) (2012).
98. 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(1)(A) (2012).
99. 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(l)(B) (2012).
100. 38 U.S.C. § 71'1(c)(2) (2012).
101. 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(l) (2012).
102. 38 U.S.C. § 71'1(c)(4)(8) (2012).
J03. 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(1) (2012).
104. 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(B) (2012).
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as "[t]he degree of r elevant evidence that a reasonable person,
considering the record as a whole, might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even though other r easonable p ersons might
disagree." 105 This is the same standard of evidence used in
Chapter 43 Performance Appraisals, and a lower standard of
review than used in Chapter 75 Adverse Actions. 106 The employee
may then appeal to the United States F ederal Circuit Court of
Appeals, where the court will review the r ecord and set aside any
agency action that is (1) found to be arbitrary or capricious, (2) not
following the required laws, rules, or regulation, or (3) a decision
unsupported by substantial evidence. to7 This Federal Circuit
standard had only been used for §7401(1) employees, who were
largely white-collar professionals, 108 until the new Accountability
Act, which extends this st andard to every covered employee. 109
This change in standards at both appellate levels essentially
hams trings the court system int o following the Agency decision,
unless the Agency decision is so egregious that no reasonable
person could find that the Agency made the correct decision.
The VA cannot have its cake and eat it too.
The
Accountability Act combines parts of both Chapter 43 (lower
standard of proof) and Chapter 75 (does not have to give the
employee an opportunity to improve) most preferable to the
Agency, slaps on an onerous time period for the average worker,
and hamstrings the courts, creating a law that is misguided,
unjust, and unconstitutional.
IV. THE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT LACKS SUFFICIENT DUE
PROCESS UNDER 'rHE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE BALANCING TEST

The Accountability Act unconstitutionally strips employees
of their requisite due process by imposing short time periods in
the pre-termination process and hamstringing the appellate
courts in the post-termination process. As discussed supra,
federal employees have a property interest in their job due to the
Civil Service Reformation Act, and are constit utionally r equired
to have Fifth Amendment due process prior to the taking of that
105. 5 C.l<'.R. § 1201.4(p) (2018),
106. Poor Performers, supra note 66, at iv.
107. See generally 5 U.S.C. §706 (2012).
108. 38 U.S.C. § 7401 (1) (2012) a pplies to "Physicians, dentists, podiatrists,
ch iropractors, optometrists, registered nurses, physician assistants, and expandedfunction dental aux iliaries."
109. 38 U.S.C. §714 (h)(l)(a)-(d) (2012).
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property.110 'l'he courts must perform a balancing test to consider
whether sufficient due process has been given to an employee who
has had an adverse action taken against them. 111
The balancing test comes from Mathews u. Eldridge, 112 and
has been adopted for use in evaluating the extent of due process
needed for adverse actions taken against government
employees.11 3 The three components of this test are: "First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest."114 Applying this Matthews test will show that t he due
process given to employees through the Accountability Act is
insufficient.
A. Prongs 1 and 3: Private and Government Interests
The first and third prongs of the test are not in dispute. It is
well-established case law that an employee has a private interest
in continuing to receive a paycheck, and it is equally well
established that the federal government needs to be able to
discipline underperforming employees, criminal employees, and
other employees guilty of malfeasances. 115
B. Prong 2: Balancing the Risk of Erroneous
Deprivation
The second prong is where the Accoun tability Act will fail;
the risk of erroneous deprivation is too high, and t he procedural
safeguards have been trimmed back to the point t hat they bold
little probative value. Suspensions are allowed to have a lower
due process standard than removals, but both require this
balancing test to be completed. 116 The length and t he finality of
the deprivation are dispositive factors in the second prong. m
1 lO. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
ll l. Id. at 542-43.
112. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 384-35 (L976).
113. Gilbel't v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931-32 (1997).
114. /d. at 931-932 (quoting Mathews, 42'1 U.S. at 335).
115. E.g., Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 928-29; Cleveland Boat"dof Education v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 552 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 455 US 422, 435 (1982).
116. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 934-35.
117. Id. at 932.
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The risk of erroneous deprivation is too mgh for employees.
The short time period given does not allow an employee to seek
adequate legal representation to navigate the notice and response
period, along with any appeals. The level of due process given
must be related to the finality and seriousness of the deprivation,
and nothing is more final or serious than a permanent removal.
When a state must act quickly, like when employees have
committed serious crimes at work, the opportunity to respond
may occur after the employee has been deprived of the job.118 The
Sixth Circuit found that pre-termination proceedings and posttermination proceedings are fundamentally intertwined, so a
deficit in one can be made up in the other. 119 In Carter u. Western
Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, an employee was
terminated and the pre-termination proceedings were
abbreviated.1 20 Due to abbreviated pre-termination proceedings,
the Court stated that post-termination hearings must be
"substantially more meaningful" in the interest of due process. 12 1
The Accountability Act provides neither adequate time for
notice and response in the pre-termination phase, nor does the
Act provide an adequate post-termination hearing. The shortened
time period before the adverse action takes place may be
permissible if the standard of evidence had not been lowered to a
nearly impossible-to-beat standard. The substantial evidence
standard used by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit is so low of a
standard that it stands to reason that there is no meaningful due
process.
This substantial evidence standard was previously used after
performance improvement plans and meetings with the employee
happened, pursuant to Chapter 43 actions. This paper trail, and
the opportunity to improve was a significant pre-termination
proceeding and struck a balance between the needs of the
employee and the needs of the employer. Chapter 75 adverse
actions had less paperwork, but a higher evidentiary standard,
providing the employee more meaningful post-termination due
process. The Accountability Act leads to employees having
adverse actions taken against them and lost appeals in both the

118. Id. at 930.
119. Carte r v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir.
1985).
120. Id. at 272.
121. Id. at 273, 274 (interna l quotations omitted)(The substance of the posttermination hear ings was unclear, as it was not included in the record sent to the Six th
Circuit Court of Appeals).
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MSPB and the Federal Circuit because a reasonable person may
determine that the record adequately supports the same
conclusion as the VA, even if that reasonable person believes the
opposing view is more compelling. Not only is the risk of
erroneous deprivation too high for the employee, the risk is too
high for the government as well.
The second stated purpose of the Accountability Act is
"whistleblower protection". The VA has been ravaged by
retaliation against whistleblowing under the old due process
scheme. L22 VA clinics have been accused of using "sham peer
reviews to permanently sabotage doctors' credibility. Physicians
truly face losing their livelihood". 123 The whistleblowing has been
widely covered in the news and was part of the justification in
passing the Accountability Act. 124
Whistleblower retaliation is growing worse under the Trump
adntinistration, with one VA physician referring to the time
period after the Accountability Act had been passed as "open
season across the nation on VA whistleblowers".125 Whistleblower
offices that are being held "in-house" are often referred to as
"Trojan horses used to identify whistleblowers for retaliation" . 126
It is counterintujtive for the Trump administration and the 115th
Congress to pass a law that simultaneously allows the federal
government to make it easier to fire workers, while allegedly
guaranteeing these same workers whistleblower protections from
retaliatory firings.
The Accountability Act fails the second prong of the Mathews
v. Eldridge test: "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional [or substitute] procedural safeguards".t27 VA
employees are being erroneously deprived of their jobs due to the

122. Josh Hicks, VA Employees Testify About Retaliation Against Whistleblowers, THE
WASinNGTON POST (Jul. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonposL.com/news/federaleye/wp/2014/07/09/va -cmployees-testi fy-a bout- reta Iia tion -against-whist Ieblowe rs/.
123. Id. (lntcrnal quotation marks omitted).
124. Sen. Marco Rubio et. al. Commentary: VA Bureaucracy Continues to Protect Bad
Employees, Hurt U. 8. Troops, MILITARY TIMES (May 11, 2017)
https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/2017/05/11 /com men ta ry-va-bureaucracy •
continues-to-protcct-bad-employecs-hurt-u-s-tt·oops/.
125. Joe Davidson, Victims Say VA Whistleblower Retaliation is Growing Under
'lhimp, Despite Rhetoric, THE WASlIINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/ncws/powerpostlwp/2017/10/30/victims-say-vawhislleblower-retalia Lion-is-growing-under-Lrum p-despite-rhetoric/.
126. Id.
127. Mathews, 424 U .S. at 321.
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lower standards of the Accountability Act, often in retaliation for
whistleblowing, a protected activity. The procedural safeguards
have little value due to the speed and ease that the VA has with
firing employees.
V . REPEALING OR OVERRULING THE ACT
This Accountability Act is unconstitutional and should be
repealed by the legislature or declared unconstitutional by the
judiciary. After coming to the conclusion that the Accountability
Act is unconstitutional, the question remains: how does one go
about striking the Act from U.S. Code? The answer may come
down to a future Congress. Other statutes that modify the Civil
Service Reform Act on an agency-specific basis are notably short,
and many have been repealed by a later Congress. 128 For
example, the 1996 Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act129 removed the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) from the jurisdiction of the MSPB
completely, and then the Wendell H. Ford Investment and Reform
Act for the 21st Century130 mostly put the FAA back under MSPB
jurisdiction. 131 It may be necessary that a more employee-rights
focused Congress will do a similar thing with the Accountability
Act, and restore employee rights in the VA.
The Accountability Act was passed on a bipartisan basis, and
thus a change in leadership in Congress and the Presidency may
not be enough to repeal the act. The final vote counts of the act
in the House of Representatives were 368 in favor, and 55
opposed, with seven representatives not voting.132 On a partisan
basis, 231 Republicans and 137 Democrats voted in favor of this
Act, and 1 Republican and 54 Democrats voted against the Act.133
The Senate passed the Act on a voice vote, so no record of
individual votes were made by Senators. 184 A s mall window into
128. What is Due Process?, si,pra note 9, at 36.
129. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-50, 109 St.at. 436 (1995).
130. Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub.
L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000).
131. id.
132. S. l094: Departmerit of Veterans Affairs Accountability a nd Whistleblower
Protectiori Act of 2017, GOVTRACK , htt,ps://www.govtTack. us/con gress/votes/ll52017/h307 (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
133. Id.
134. S. 1094: Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower
Protecti.on Act of 2017, GOVTRACK (last, updated June 14, 2017),
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the Senate proceedings on the bill would be looking at the cosponsors of the bill, which were made up of 31 Republicans, 7
Democrats, and 1 Independent, 1 35 who joined the lead sponsor,
Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) in passing this bill. 136 President Donald
Trump eagerly supported the bill, tweeting to the internet that:
The passage of the @DeptVetAffairs Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act is GREAT news for veterans! I look
forward to signing itP37
Other laws with similar means and ends also passed with
bipartisan support. The Veterans Access to Care through Choice,
Accountability, and Transparency Act of 2014, which limited due
process for senior executives in the VA passed 91-3 in the Senate
and 420-5 in the House of Representatives. 138 President Obama
signed the 2014 bill into law with little delay. 139 Both laws limit
federal employee rights, and both laws were passed on a
bipartisan basis. The Accountability Act is already being treated
as a foundation and model for future accountability acts that will
affect other executive departments. 140 Both the Labor
https://www.govtrack.us/congrcss/bills/115/s1094.
135. S . 1091: Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection Act of 2017, Details, GOVTRACK,
https:/lwww.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s1094/details (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
136. S. 1094: Department of Veterans Affairs Accotmtability and Whi.stleblower
Protection Act of 2017, Summary, GOV'fRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/sl094/summary (last visited Dec. 21,
2018).
137. Donald Trump, (@rea!Donald'l'rump), 'l'WT'M'ER (Jun. 13, 2017, 1:18 PM),
https://twitter.comlrcaJDonaldTrump/status/874767922295705600; Pres. Trump also
tweeted support for the bill after it was initially passed by the Senate and sent to the
House of Representatives, stating, "Senate passed the VA Accountability Act. The
House should get this bill to my desk ASAP! We can't tolerate substandard care for
our vets." Donald 1'rump, (@realDonaldTrump), 'Pwl'f'fER (Jun. 6, 2017, 6:07 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonald'l'i-ump/status/872258719404482561.
138. All those who voted against the 2014 Act in both the Senate and the !Jouse of
Representatives were Republicans; GOVTRACK, H.R. 3230 (113th): Veterans Access,
Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Senate Vote #254 in 2014 (J 13th Congress),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/J 13-2014/s251 (last visited Sept,. 30, 2018);
GOVTRACI<, H.R. 3230 (113th): Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014,
House Vote #467 in 2014 (113th Congress)
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/l l3-20l1/h467 (last visited Sept. 30, 2018);
See Ashton Habighurst, Enhancing Accountability at the Department of Veterans
Affairs: The Legality of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014
Under the Due Process Clause, 61(4) Cath. U. L. Rev. 1045, 1054-55 (2015).
139. Cameron Brenchley, President Obama Signs Bill to Give the VA the Resources lt
Needs, THE WIIITE HOUSE: PHl,SlDEN1' BARACK OBAMA, BLOG (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://obamawhitehonse.archives.gov/blog/2014/08/07/president-obama-signs-billgive-va-resources-it-needs.
140. Nicole Ogrysko, lfotise Bills Would Extend Same VA Removal Authorities to
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Department Accountability Act141 and the Education Department
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act142 were
introduced into the House of Representatives in December 2017,
though neither has gained much traction. 143 In the interim,
President Trump has since signed an Executive Order instructing
all executive agencies to push for more removals under Title 5,
and forbidding contract bargaining negotiations over removal
procedures. 144
However, in 2018 there has been a bipartisan pushback in
the House of Representatives and the Senate regarding the way
the Accountability Act is being executed by the VA. Members of
the Committee on Veterans' Affairs in the Senate wrote letters to
then Secretary Shulkin and to the VA Inspector General, Michael
J. Missal.1 45 A February 13, 2018 letter from Senator Tammy
Duckworth (D-IL) to Shulkin contained criticisms about the bill
being used primarily
to remove front-line workers like
housekeeping aids, cooks, and laundry workers instead of higherranking VA personnel such as supervisors who are experiencing
performance problems or committing misconduct. 146 A February
26, 2018 letter from Jon 1'ester (D-MT), Richard Blumenthal (DCT), et. al, states that the VA has ceased using progressive
discipline, and managers in the VA are removing employees for
first offenses such as moving too slowly after returning from

l.,abor, Education Secretaries, FEDERAL Ni,ws RADIO (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://federalnewsradio.com/legislation/2018/02/house-bills-wou]d-extend-same-varemoval-authoriLies-to-labor-education-employees/.
141. Department of Labor Accountability AcL of 2017, H.R. 4703, 115th Cong. § 1.
142. Department of Education Accountability and WhisLleblower Protection Act of
2017, H.R. 4 702, 115th Cong. § l.
143. Both bills have gained only four sponsors and cosponsors, and both bills have the
same four representatives, Rep. Francis Rooney (R-FL), Rep. Lloyd Smucker (R-PA),
Rep. Ralph Norman (R-SC), and Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-1'~L). Rep. Smucker introduced
the Labor Oepi. bill and Rep. Rooney introduced the Ed. Dept. bill. Both Bills were
referred to committee on December 20, 2017 and have had no further action taken.
H.R. 4702- Department of Education Accountability and Whi.~tleblower Protection
Act, CONGRESS.GOV, h tips://www .congress.gov/bill/I 15th-congrcss/house-bill/4 7021
(last visited Sept. 30, 2018); H.R. 4703 - Department of Labor Accountability Act of
2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bilJ/l l5th-congress/housebiU/47031(1ast visited Sept. 30, 2018).
144. Exec. Order No. 13839, 83 Fed. Reg. 25, 343 (June 1, 2018).
145. See, e.g. Lett.er from Sen. Tammy Duckworth, U.S. Senate to Sec'y David Shulkin,
Oep't of Veterans Affairs (Feb. 13, 2018),
hLtps://www.duckworLh.senate.gov/imolmedia/dod2018.02. l3%20%20Letter%20to%20Sec.%20Shull<ln%20rc%20VA%20Accountability%20&%20Whist
lcblower. ... pdf.
146. Id.
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mJury, or for missing a deadline.147 A June letter was sent to
Missal, stating that the VA was not reporting to Congress about
the implementation of the Accountability Act, and that Senators
on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs were receiving reports that
the law was being used in an inconsistent and inappropriate
manner. 148 House Representative Brian Fitzpatrick introduced a
bill in the House of Representatives on June 14, 2018 that would
repeal parts of the Accountability Act and make VA employees
again subject to the same removal, demotion, and suspension
policies as other employees of the Federal Government. 149 If the
Accountability Act continues to fail, and to gain bipartisan
opposition, removing the Act through the legislature would be the
best way to restore worker's rights in the VA.
It is unlikely that the Accountability Act will be seen by a
court to determine its constitutionality. Federal employees have
to appeal the agency decision to the MSPB and to the Federal
Circuit Court. The Federal Circuit Court is primarily a patent
court and is ill-suited to deal with employee due process claims. 150
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit shows substantial deference to
the MSPB decision, overturning only a small portion of MSPB
decisions. 15 t With a lower standard of evidence specified by the
147. Letter from Sen. Jon '!'ester et. al, US Senate to Sec'y David Shulkin, Dep't of
Veterans Affairs (Feb. 26, 2018),
h ttps://admin.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_cdi t/03 l 3 l 8valetter. pdf.
148. Letter from Sen. Jon Tester et. al, US Senate to MichaelJ. Missal, Inspector Gen.
at the Dep't of Veterans Affairs (Jun. 15, 2018),
hUps://www.veterans.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-0615%20Accountability%20and%20Whist1ehlower%20Protection%20Act.pdf.
14.9. Gov'l'RACK, 11.R.6/01(11511•): VA Personnel Equity Act of 2018,
hUps://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr6lOl (last visited ,Jan. 25, 2019); See also
Gov'l'RACI<, H. R. 6101: VA Personnel Equity Act of 2018,
https://www.govLrack.us/congress/bilJs/ll5/hr6101/details (lasL visited Jan. 25, 2019).
150. AL the end of 2017, Lhe T<'ederal Circuit had 61 currently pending MSPB appeals
before it, 6 pending appeals from the Department of Veterans Affairs, 639 pending
appeals from the Patent and Trade mark Oflice, anrl 524 pending patent appeals from
the District Courts. The F ederal Circuit had 1,578 cases currently pending, wiLh more
than 6 in 10 cases being relaLed Lo patents. U.S. C1'. OF AJ'PEALS !•'OR THE F ED. CIR.,
Year-to-Date Activity as of December 3 I, 2017,
http://www.ca fc. uscourts.gov/sites/defau l t/fi les/the-cou rt/stat istics/Y'fD-Activity •
December-2017.pdf; The total appeals filed are a little more promising, but not by
much. Patent and trademark cases make up approximately 65% of appeals filed in the
Federal Circuit, MSPB and personnel management appeals make up 11% of t he filed
cases. U.S. •I'. OP APPEALS !'OR THE FED. CIR., Appeals Filed, by Category FY 2017,
http://www.ca fc.u scou rts. gov/sites/defa u I t/fi Ies/thecourt/s ta Listics/ FY_ l 7_Fil ings_by_Category. pdf.
151. Only 9% of MSPB cases were reversed by Federal Circuit judges in Lhe twelve•
month period ending on September 30, 2017. U.S CT. or APPEALS f'Of< THI!: FED. CIR.,
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Accountability Act, even more deference may be given to the
MSPB decision, and thus the Agency decision. After a review of
Federal Circuit case law dealing with federal employee due
process, decisions in favor of employees claiming to lack due
process in federal employment decisions are generally found when
ex parte communication has occurred between the proposing
official and the deciding official. 152
The chances are slim that the Accountability Act will even be
heard by the S upreme Court of the United States. The Supreme
Court has between 7,000 and 8,000 cases filed each year, but
historically only takes on approximately 80 cases each year. 153
This number has fallen in recent years, with the Supreme Court
hearing only 71 cases in the 2014 term 154, and only 70 cases in the
2016 term155, the lowest numbers since World War II. 156 It would
be unexpected for the Supreme Court to review a case regarding
the Accountability Act, and should not be counted on in efforts to

Table B-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - ,Appeals Filed, Terminated,
and Pending Dur1:11g the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 201 7,
http://www.cafc.11scou1·ts.gov/sitcs/defau It/files/lhccoul'l'IAppea hs_ Pi lcd_'I'e1·minatcd_Pcntling_20J 7.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 'l'hc
l.wo prior years 2016 and 2016 have 6% and 4%, res_pcctively, ofMSPB cases l'Oversed
by the Federal Cil-cuit. u.s CT. QI> /\Pl'l'J\~ FOR 1'HE Prm. Cm.. '/'able 13-8 U.S. Court of
Appeals for the l'i'edcral Circuit - Appeals Filed, 'l'crminated. a1td Pe1tdin,: During the
'l~uelve-Month Period g,ufed Septembel' 30. 2015,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/iiles/thecourt/statistics/appeals_filed_terminated_and_pending.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2019); U.S CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. Cm., 'foble lJ-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit - J\pf)C!als Filed, Terminatad, a11d PencUng During the 7'welue-Month
Peri.od Ended September 30, 2016, http://www.cafc.uscourt.s.gov/sites/defau1t/fi!es/thecourt/statistics/FY16_Appeals_Filed_'l'erminated_and_Pending_2.pdf (last visited
Jan. 25, 2019).
152. See Young v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 706 F.3d 1372,
1376 (Ji'cd. Cir. 2013); Stone v. l?OLC, 179 l•'.3d 1368, 1374-1375 (Feel. Cir. 1999); but
i;ce, !lull v. De1>t.. of Air ft'orco, 374 F'cd. Appx. 981 , 982 (F'ed. Cir. 2010). Ex partc
communication t·oquircs an analysis under Stone, but the, anulysis is nol. relevant l.o
the Accountability Act outside the fact that the Federal Circuit generally finds in favor
of employees in these types of cases.
153. Of the approximately 180 cases per year, about 80 cases receive plenary review
along with oral arguments, and about 100 cases are decided without plenary review.
Sur. C1'. 01•1•1m U.S., 'l1ie Justices' Caseload,
hLtps://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
154. Oliver Roeder, 'J'he Supreme Court's Caseload ls On 'l~·ach To Be The lightest in
70 Years, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (May 17, 2016), htLps://fivethirtyeight.com/features/thesu preme-courts-caseload•is-on• track• Lo•be-the -ligh Lest- in-70-yea rs/.
155. SUP. CT. Or' 'PIIE U.S., Opinions of the Court - 2016 (last updated Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/16.
156. Roeder, supra note 154.
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repeal the Act. 1 57 Even if the Supreme Court were to review the
Accountability Act- and until this happens- federal employees
will continue to be improperly and unconstitutionally removed
from their jobs and losing their livelihood.
VI. REAL PlJRPOSE OF THE ACT

The Accountability Act changes many terms of public
employment at the VA, but the Act does not fundam entally
change the reasoning used to fixe workers with petforma nce
issues or workers who have committed crimes; the law only affects
the time periods and standards of review. Over 500 VA employees
were fired between January 20, 2017, and July 7, 2017. 158 This
is, on average, 100 firings per month. Between January 20, 2017
and December 31, 2017, the VA removed 1,440 employees,
averaging 140 removals per month. Across the entire federal
government, 77,000 full time employees were removed between
2000 and 2014, averaging 5,000 per year. 159 Bad employees were
already being fired before this Accountability Act was passed, but
those employees retained their due process rights.
The Accountability Act instead is both a push for a
privatization of veteran care and a push to bust public sector
unions. Over 49,000 job positions are open at the VA across the
nation, and the failure to fill these empty positions has caused
protests outside of the VA hospitals with demands that these
positions be filled.160 An internal memorandum sent on April 14,
157. Interestingly, in 2016, a case involving the MSPB was appealed Lo the Supremo
Court, ruul the cow-t sided with the employee. /Je,-ry v. MS JJB involved a question of
appellate procedure, specifically if federal em1>loyees could fil e o discrimination claim
in federal district court, even if LhaLsame claim was dismissed by Lhe MS PB for lack
of jurisdiction. The court found in favor of the employee on a 7-2 basis (Justices
Gorsuch and Thomas dissenting). Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 137 S.Ct.
1975 (2017).
158. While the Accountability Act was signed into law on June 14, 2017, the Act
requires lhe VI\ to disclose t he number of i-cmovals weekly in a running totlJI. with t he
first report coming out t he week o[ July 7, 2017. Pl"ior to this requil·ed repoi·Ling, lhe
VI\ di d not d isclose tho number of removals. Using the ,July 7 daLc provides tho best
estimate of 1·emovals unde1· the old system. DEPT. OF V1,;TERANS /\FF., Accountabilit.Y
Ueport (Feb. 7, 20 18).
htLpi;;//www.va.gov/accountability/Adverse_Actions_Jfoport_20 l 7_050418_ I .pelf; J oe
Davidson, VA /ires more than 500 feds unde,· Trn,mp, even lxifore 11ew accountability
law, THE WASIJJNGTON POST, (Jul. 9,2017),
https;//www.washingtonpostcom/news/powerpost/wp/201 7/07/ l 0/va•fires-more-than500-feds-under-Lrump-even-before-new-accouniability-l aw/.
159. What is Du.e Process?, supra note 9, at 4 l.
160. FederalSoup SLafI, VA Hospital Employees Protest Unfilled Vacancies,
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20 17 from former Secretary Shulkin, was obtained by the
Associated Press. 161 In that memorandum, Shulkin stated that
the VA will become leaner and that the VA will adopt a long-term
plan to outsource veteran health needs to private hospitals. 162
This memo implies that these positions will never be filled. t63
However, former Secretary Shulkin claims that he was fired from
the VA for being opposed to privatization. 164
This Act is also a union-busting bill in disguise. The
Accountability Act has certain clauses that state it directly
overrules any existing collective bargaining agreement between
unions and the federal government, and forces unions to follow
the same time periods in any grievances.165 The largest union
that represents VA employees is the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE), and they have been loudly
outspoken over the affects this act will have on employees, the VA,
and the union itself. t 66 The President of the AFGE, J. David Cox
Sr., stated in testimony before the Senate Veterans Affairs
Committee, that the Act "decreases accountability at the VA, it
eviscerates the agency it is supposed to improve, and ensures that
no employee ever gets a fair shake on any proposed adverse
action". 167 Cox went on to explain that the VA's true problem is
the severe shortage of employees working, leading to long hours
and increased burn out.168

FE0ERALSOUP (Sep. 08, 2017), https://fedetalsoup.com/articles/2017/09/08/vahospital-employees-demand-vancancies-be-filled.aspx.
161. ASSOCJATED PRESS, 1'h ousands of Jobs to Remain Unfilled in Trump's Veterans
Affairs Department, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017)
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/thousands-jobs-remain-unfilled-trumpva-articlc-1.3103936.
162. ld.
163. Id.
164. David J. Shulkin, David J. Shulkin.: Privatizi1ig the V.A. Will Hurt Veterans, N.Y.
'l'lME:S (Mal'. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/opinioo/shulkinveterans-affairs-privatization.html; Laurel Wamsley & Scott Neuman, Fired VA
Secretary Says White Hou.se Muzzled Him, NPR (Mar. 29, 2018)
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/29/597866101/fired-va-secretal'ysays-white-house-muzzled-him.
1.65. 38 U.S.C. § 7l4(c)(l)(D) (2012); 38 U.S.C. § 7l4(c)(l0) (2012).
166. Statement by J. David Cox, Sr., Nat'] Presidenl., Am. Fed. of Gov't Emp.'s, AFLCIO before the Comm. On Veterans' Affairs (May 17, 2017).
167. ld.
168. Id.; see also Joe Davidson, Loss of VA Health-Care Providers Grows as Demand
for Care Increases. Will Service Suffer?, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/08/02/demand-for-vahealth-care-increases-but-so-does-the-loss-of-health-careproviders/?utm_term=.aa32dad0f8bc.
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All of these secondary purposes of the Accountability Act are
similar to the "starve the beast" strategy embraced by modern
conservatives. First taxes are cut, and then once the money
coming into the federal government has dried up, programs are
cut in an effort to balance the budget. 169 This idea is summarized
by Grover Norquist, President of the Americans for Tax Reform,
who stated "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to
reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and
drown it in the bathtub." 170 In the recent changes at the VA,
employees are being cut to levels inadequate to staff facilities, and
the quality of service has declined. m This drop in quality of
service is brought forward by the news media, and in response,
politicians make further changes that only harm workers. At this
rate, the obvious next step will be to cut the VA itself to make the
system ''leaner" and more reliant on private sector health
services.

VII.

CONCLUSION

This new law is unjust to workers, misguided in scope and
purpose, and is ultimately unconstitutional. A federal employee
that has just cause job protection has a property right to their job.
The Fifth Amendment states that the federal government cannot
take property away from an individual without due process. Due
process requires that an individual receive notice, have an
opportunity to respond, and be allowed an appeal to a neutral
third party. The reasonableness of procedures performed
whenever the government is taking property away from an
individual is evaluated under Matthews v. Eldridge. The
Accountability Act fails the Matthews u. Eldridge balancing test,
making any removal of a federal employee since the enactment of
this law a violation of due process. There is Uttle judicial
opportunity to strike this act as unconstitutional. It is unclear if
workers' constitutionally protected rights will be reinstated, and
it is unlikely that any of the already removed workers will be
made whole. However, there is rising political distaste toward the
Accountability Act, and the most prudent way to remove this law
is to repeal it through legislative processes.
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